核电厂安全

的 2011 accident at Fukushima 这是一个警钟，提醒世界核电厂在地震和洪水等自然灾害面前的脆弱性吗.

然而, nature is not the only potential threat to nuclear facilities. 的y are also inviting targets for sabotage and terrorist attacks. 对核电站的成功攻击可能会带来毁灭性的后果, 杀死, 导致核电站周围地区大量居民患病或流离失所, and causing extensive long-term environmental damage.

保护核设施不受破坏是联合国的任务之一 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 的 NRC makes security rules that all plants must follow, covering issues such as security access zones, the kinds of threats plant security systems must be prepared to meet, the size and capabilities of security staffing, and how often security systems must be tested.

2001年9月11日的事件使核安全问题成为人们关注的焦点. 甚至在9/11之前, UCS专家指出了NRC安全规定及其执行的严重缺陷. Despite the changes that the NRC has put into place after 9/11, some of these concerns remain unaddressed. U.S. nuclear plants are still not as secure as they can and should be.

定义威胁

一个安全系统的充分性取决于我们认为我们在防范什么. 如果我们低估了威胁，我们就可能高估了我们应对威胁的准备程度. NRC有时会对潜在的攻击者做出不切实际的假设.

设计基础威胁(DBT)是电厂管理需要防范的安全威胁的官方定义. (目前还不清楚谁负责防范DBT之外的威胁.9/11之后，UCS以以下理由批评DBT建设核电站:

It ignored the possibility of air- and water-based attacks; 它没有解决大型攻击组织使用多个入口的可能性, or of an attack involving multiple insiders; It concentrated on threats to the reactor core, failing to address the vulnerability of spent fuel storage facilities. 近年来，其中一些问题得到了解决，但仍然存在严重的缺陷. 例如，UCS的 post-Fukushima safety and security recommendations, 发布于2011年, 注意到核管理委员会最终修改了其规则，以解决新反应堆设计中的飞机攻击威胁，但同时拒绝了针对水基和陆基攻击的设计修改建议.

上乘的测试

To ensure that security systems will work in the event of an actual attack, 核管理委员会定期进行武力对武力(FOF)检查演习，以模拟攻击并评估其成功的可能性. 的se tests cannot fully simulate actual attacks; for example, plant owners must receive some advance warning. 然而，它们对于评估工厂安全部队的效力是有用的.

在20世纪90年代, 美国核管理委员会的测试项目显示，近一半被测试的核电站存在严重的安全漏洞. This program was revised after 9/11, 但, 平均, more than 5 percent of plants are failing FOF tests..

的re is also concern about the testing standard used. 2012年3月，UCS建议NRC推进其采用“边际失效”评估的计划, 如何区分勉强够用的表现和强劲的表现, 而不是一个通过/失败系统，在这个系统中，除非模拟攻击完全成功，否则工厂将通过测试.

In July 2012, the NRC adopted the new process. 然而, as a result of industry pressure, the standards were watered down, 这样，如果一家工厂在其他安全领域表现良好，那么糟糕的FOF测试结果就可以被忽略.

最后, FOF testing is currently required only for operating reactors, 对于已经关闭的反应堆是否有足够的防护措施，人们产生了疑问, 但仍然含有放射性物质，如果损坏可能会对公众造成伤害.

Transparency and public trust

9/11事件后, 核电安全政策617888九五至尊娱乐力度加大. 核管理委员会曾经在哪里, 在一定程度上, sought public input into its decisions on questions like the DBT, 随后，它与行业代表完全闭门做出了这些决定.

虽然在一次重大恐怖袭击之后收紧信息获取是可以理解的, 核管理委员会有责任就核安全问题征求公众意见并作出回应, in which the public has an obvious interest.

这是核管理委员会需要做的

福岛核事故后，UCS向核管理委员会提出的建议包括几个专门解决安全问题的项目.

核管理委员会应:

• Revise its assumptions about terrorists' capabilities to ensure nuclear plants are adequately protected against credible threats, and these assumptions should be reviewed by U.S. 情报机构.
• Modify the way it judges force-on-force security exercises by strengthening the assessment of a plant's "margin to failure."
• Establish a program for licensing private security guards 这需要成功完成联邦政府监督的培训课程，并定期重新认证.
• Require new reactor designs to be more secure against land- and water-based terrorist attacks.
• Require reactor owners to improve the security of existing dry cask storage facilities.